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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This appeal is taken from an Order Granting Neways' Motion for Summary Judgment and 
Macris' Cross Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and from the Judgment dated November 13, 
1997, of the Fourth Judicial District Court, in and for Utah County, State of Utah, the Honorable 
Howard H. Maetani presiding. This case was assigned to the Utah Court of Appeals. The Utah 
Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(j) 
(1997). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Whether res judicata bars a claim for damages against an alleged successor 
corporation when the alleged successor corporation could have been and should have been 
included as a party to a previous action. R. 460. An appellate court accords no deference to a 
trial court's legal conclusions given to support the grant of summary judgment, but reviews them 
for correctness. Schurtz v. BMW of N. Am., Inc., 814 P.2d 1108 (Utah 1991). 
2. Whether the trial court erroneously granted summary judgment that Neways, Inc. 
("Neways") was a successor company of Images & Attitudes, Inc. ("Images") when genuine 
issues of material fact exist that Eclat, Inc. ("Eclat"), not Neways, is the successor company of 
Images. R. 460. The appellate court must review the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
losing party, and affirms only where it appears there is no genuine dispute as to any material 
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issues of fact. Hunt v. ESI Esg'g, Inc., 808 P.2d 1137 (Utah Ct. App.), cert denied, 826 P.2d 
651 (Utah 1991). 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES. 
ORDINANCES. AND RULES 
Rule 56(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states: 
(C) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion shall be served 
at least 10 days before the time fixed for the hearing. The adverse 
party prior to the day of hearing may serve opposing affidavits. The 
judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, 
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, 
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine 
issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to 
a judgment as a matter of law. 
Id. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND RELEVANT FACTS 
On or about August 7, 1989, Macris & Associates ("Macris") became an independent 
distributor for Images, a multi-level marketing company. R. 228. When Macris became a 
distributor, Macris and Images entered into a contract that consisted of both a distributor 
application and an addendum. R. 228. 
In March of 1991, Images terminated its contract with Macris. R. 228. Because of the 
termination, Macris filed a complaint against Images in the Fourth Judicial District Court, Macris 
& Associates v. Images, Civil No. 910400358, alleging breach of contract. R. 208-214. In June 
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of 1992, Macris amended his complaint and added two more causes of action. R. 227. The 
matter was scheduled for trial on September 28, 1992. R. 280. 
In early September of 1992, Images ceased doing business. R. 227. Neways purchased 
only some of Images' assets and paid valuable consideration for them. R. 351. In the transfer of 
assets, Neways did not assume any of Images' obligations to Macris. See Asset Purchase 
Agreement, attached in Addendum; R. 325-49, 351. Further, the majority of the board of 
directors, shareholders, and officers for Neways and Images are not the same. R. 351. The 
remainder of the assets and liabilities were transferred to another corporation known as Eclat. 
The September 28, 1992 trial for the Macris & Associates v. Images matter was vacated 
and eventually the trial occurred on February 16, 1995. R. 227. More than two years before 
trial, Macris learned that Images had ceased doing business and Neways had purchased some of 
its assets. R. 227. During these two years, the trial court reopened discovery and allowed Macris 
every opportunity to pursue its successor liability claim. R. 273-79, 507 p. 12. Macris' counsel 
even took three days to review Neways documentation during this discovery period. R. 507 p. 14. 
Macris never named Neways as a defendant in Macris & Associates v. Images. 
On or about February 14, 1995, Macris filed a new complaint in the Fourth Judicial 
District Court of the State of Utah, Macris & Associates v. Neways, Civil No. 950400093, 
alleging future damages and successor liability. R. 1-12. The second action was filed two days 
before the Images trial. R. 227. All claims in the second action arise out of the same allegations 
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of breach of contract that were the basis for the first action, Macris & Associates v. Images. R. 
507 p.8. 
In the Images action, the Fourth Judicial District Court, Judge Burningham presiding, held 
that Images had breached its contract with Macris. R. 279. The court further awarded Macris 
damages that allegedly accrued between February 1, 1991, to August 31, 1992, the day Images 
stopped doing business. R. 279. The Utah Court of Appeals affirmed Judge Burningham's 
decision. See Macris & Associates v. Images & Attitudes, Inc., 941 P.2d 636 (Utah Ct. App. 
1997). 
In October of 1995, Neways filed a Motion for Summary Judgment in Macris & 
Associates v. Neways, arguing that res judicata bars Macris' claims for future damages and 
successor liability in the second action. R. 184-229. Macris filed its own Motion for Summary 
Judgment, arguing that Neways is liable for Images' obligation to Macris, using a theory of 
successor liability. R. 284-85. 
On September 19, 1997, the Fourth Judicial District Court, Judge Howard Maetani 
presiding, issued a Memorandum Decision in Macris & Associates v. Neways. R. 433. The trial 
court held that the doctrine of res judicata bars Images from claiming future damages against 
Neways, but failed to apply the doctrine of res judicata to bar Macris' claim of successor liability. 
R. 421-33. The trial court entered its order granting summary judgment on November 13, 1997. 
R. 465-67. 
4 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court erroneously granted summary judgment in favor of Macris by holding that 
Neways was the successor corporation of Images. The doctrine of res judicata bars Macris' 
successor liability claim against Neways. Utah law is clear that res judicata will bar a claim if 
the claim for relief was once litigated on the merits. See Salt Lake City v. Silver Fork Pipeline, 
Inc., 913 P.2d 731, 733 (Utah 1995). The Utah Supreme Court has established the following 
criteria to determine if a claim has been litigated on the merits: 
First, both cases must involve the same parties or their privies. Second, the 
claim that is alleged to be barred must have been presented in the first suit or must 
be one that could and should have been raised in the first action. Third, the first 
suit must have resulted in a final judgment on the merits. 
Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 245, 247 (Utah 1988). 
As determined by the district court, all three elements of the res judicata test are satisfied. 
First, while Neways denies that it is the successor to Images, Neways is Images' privy because of 
the purchase of some of Images' assets and assumption of some of the liabilities. Second, Macris 
clearly could have and should have included its successor liability claim against Neways in the first 
action. The facts demonstrate that Macris knew for more than two years before trial that Neways 
had purchased some of Images' assets. Macris had fiill knowledge of his alleged claim against 
Neways but failed to amend his complaint to include Neways as a party. Third, there has been a 
final judgment on the first action that was affirmed on appeal. See Macris & Associates, Inc. v. 
Images & Attitudes, Inc., 941 P.2d 636 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). Because of Macris' failure to 
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amend, both parties have had to pay excessive costs of court and attorney's fees while burdening 
judicial resources. Moreover, Neways was not given an opportunity to defend itself in the Images 
action. Therefore, Neways respectfully requests this Court to affirm the trial court's grant of 
summary judgment against Macris' new claims against Neways and extend the trial court's 
analysis to preclude Macris from pursuing successor liability against Neways. 
In the alternative, if this Court finds that res judicata does not bar Macris' successor 
liability claim, then the trial court erroneously granted summary judgment because there are 
genuine issues of material fact as to whether Neways is Images' successor. Notwithstanding the 
fact that uncontradicted evidence presented to the trial court established that Neways gave 
valuable consideration to Images for the purchase of some of Images' assets, and that Neways 
and Images share only one director and officer, the trial court found that there was not valuable 
consideration given for the purchase of Images' assets by Neways. Further, the trial court held 
that Neways was a mere continuation of Images because the two companies have the same 
directors, officers, shareholders, employees and products. This finding is contradicted by the 
evidence. The evidence before the trial court clearly creates genuine issues of material fact. 
Therefore, the trial court erroneously held that Neways was Images' successor. Consequently, 
Neways requests that this Court reverse and remand to the trial court the issue of whether 
Neways is Images' successor corporation. 
6 
ARGUMENT 
L RES JUDICATA BARS MACRIS' SUCCESSOR LIABILITY CLAIM AGAINST 
NEWAYS 
Macris' Complaint against Neways alleges three causes of action, namely: fraudulent 
transfer, successor liability, and alter ego. R. 1-12. These claims, including successor liability, all 
arise from the same breach of contract that was the basis of the first action against Images. As 
such, the doctrine of res judicata precludes all three claims, including successor liability, as a 
matter of law. 
The doctrine of res judicata has two branches: claim preclusion and collateral estoppel, 
otherwise known as issue preclusion. The branch applicable to this appeal is claim preclusion. 
Claim preclusion "bars the litigation of a claim that previously has been fully litigated between the 
same parties." Copper State Thrift and Loan v. Bruno, 735 P.2d 387, 389 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
The reason for which claim preclusion bars a second claim is: 
[hjaving been defeated on the merits in one action, a plaintiff sometimes attempts 
another action seeking the same or approximately the same relief but adducing a 
different substantive law premise or ground. This does not constitute the 
presentation of a new claim when the new premise or ground is related to the same 
transaction or series of transactions, and accordingly the second action should be 
held barred. 
Berry v. Berry, 738 P.2d 246, 248 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) (quoting Restatement (Second) of 
Judgments § 25 comment d (1982)). 
7 
Res judicata bars a second action when the following three elements are met: 
First, both cases must involve the same parties or their 
privies. Second, the claim that is alleged to be barred must have 
been presented in the first suit or must be one that could and should 
have been raised in the first action. Third, the first suit must have 
resulted in a final judgment on the merits. 
Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 245, 247 (Utah 1988); see Salt Lake City v. Silver Fork Pipeline, 
Inc., 913 P.2d 731, 733 (Utah 1995); Schaer v. UtahDept. Of Transportation, 657 P.2d 1337, 
1340 (Utah 1983); State of Utah v. J.T., 877 P.2d 161, 163 (Utah Ct. App. 1994); Copper State 
Thrift and Loan v. Bruno, 735 P.2d 387, 389 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). This doctrine "is based on 
the premise that the proper administration of justice is best served by limiting parties to one fair 
trial of an issue or cause." State of Utah v. J.T, 877 P.2d 161, 162 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) 
(quoting Trimble Real Estate v. Monte Vista Ranch, 758 P.2d 451, 453 (Utah Ct. App. 1988)). 
Further, the doctrine has evolved to protect the public interest by '"fostering reliance on prior 
adjudication', 'preventing inconsistent judgments', 'relieving parties of the cost and vexation of 
multiple lawsuits', and 'conserving judicial resources'." Id. (quoting Office of Recovery Servs. 
v. V.G.P., 845 P.2d. 944, 946 (Utah Ct. App. 1992)); see Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94, 
101 S.Ct. 411, 415, 66 L.Ed.2d 308 (1980). 
After having failed to plead Neways as a party in the first action, Macris & Associates v. 
Images, Civil No. 910400358, Macris tries in a second action to use a different substantive law 
premise, successor liability, to find Neways liable for Images' breach of contract, Macris & 
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Associates v. Neways, Civil No. 950400093. However, the doctrine of res judicata bars the 
successor liability claim. 
A. BOTH MACRIS & ASSOCIATES V. IMAGES AND MACRIS & ASSOCIATES V. 
NEWAYS INVOLVE THE SAME PARTIES OR THEIR PRIVIES 
The first element of res judicata is that both cases must involve the same parties or their 
privies. See Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 245, 247 (Utah 1988). This element is satisfied. 
Obviously, Macris & Associates is the same party plaintiff in both Macris & Associates v. Images, 
Civil No. 910400358, and Macris & Associates v. Neways, Civil No. 950400093. The remaining 
question, then, is whether Neways is the same party as Images or is at least Images' privy. For 
purposes of the underlying summary judgment motion, Neways acknowledged that it is Images' 
privy; however, Neways did not admit that it was the successor corporation of Images. R. 323-
24. 
Utah law is clear that a party can be the privy of another and not be the successor 
corporation, but a successor is necessarily a privy. "The legal definition of a person in privity with 
another, is a person so identified in interest with another that he represents the same legal right. 
This includes a mutual or successive relationship to rights in property." Searle Bros, v. Searle, 
588 P.2d 689, 691 (Utah 1978); see B.J.H. v. State of Utah, 945 P.2d 158, 163 (Utah Ct. App. 
1997); Taylor v. Barker, 262 P. 266, 268 (Utah 1927). The uncontradicted evidence established 
that Neways purchased assets from Images and therefore "had a successive right in property" with 
Images. If Neways is a "successor in interest of property that is the subject of pending litigation 
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to which his transferor [Images] is bound" then Neways is "entitled to the benefits of the rules of 
res judicata to the same extent as [its] transferor . . . ." Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 44 
(1982); Golden State Bottling Co., Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board, 414 U.S. 168, 179 
(1973). 
Macris' arguments before the trial court were self-contradicting. Macris denies the privity 
and argues that Neways is the successor corporation of Images. R. 287-93. A successor 
corporation is defined in the common law as: 
The general rule seems to be that where a corporation sells or otherwise transfers 
all of its assets, its transferee is not necessarily liable for the debts and liabilities of 
the transferor. Under some circumstances, the transferee may be held liable for the 
debts of the transferor, to wit: (1) where there is an express or implied assumption 
of liability; (2) where the transaction amounts to a consolidation or merger; (3) 
where the transaction was fraudulent; (4) where some of the elements of a 
purchase in good faith were lacking, as where the transfer was without 
consideration and the creditors of the transferor were not provided for; or (5) 
where the transferee corporation was a mere continuation or reincarnation of the 
old corporation. 
Memorandum Decision at p. 8, attached in Addendum (quoting 49 A.L.R. 3d 881, 883); R. 426. 
While Neways admitted, for purposes of the summary judgment only, that Neways was a 
privy of Images, Neways contradicted, by affidavit, Macris' claim that Neways was the successor 
of Images. Nonetheless, whether this Court finds that Neways is either in privity with or the 
successor of Images, the result is the same. If this Court finds that Neways is in privity with 
Images, then the first element of res judicata is satisfied. See State of Utah v. 1T., 877 P.2d 161, 
163 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). On the other hand, if this Court finds that Neways is the "successor in 
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interest of property that is the subject of pending litigation to which his transferor [Images] is 
bound" then Neways is "entitled to the benefits of the rules of res judicata to the same extent as 
[its] transferor " and res judicata bars any new claims, including the successor liability claim. 
Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 44 (1982); see Golden State Bottling Co., Inc. v. National 
Labor Relations Board, 414 U.S. 168, 179 (1973) ("Persons acquiring an interest in property that 
is a subject of litigation are bound by, and entitled to the benefit of, subsequent judgment. . . ."). 
B. MACRIS' SUCCESSOR LIABILITY CLAIM COULD HAVE AND SHOULD HAVE 
BEEN BROUGHT IN THE EARLIER ACTION. 
In the second action, Maoris & Associates v. Neways, Macris alleges that Neways should 
be forced to pay the judgment that Macris obtained against Images, applying a theory of successor 
liability. However, Macris did not allege successor liability against Neways in the first action, 
Macris & Associates v. Images. Because Macris could and should have brought the successor 
liability claim against Neways in the first action, res judicata bars Macris' present successor 
liability claim. 
1. Macris' successor liability claim is barred by res judicata because it could have been 
alleged in Macris & Associates v. Images. 
The trial court erroneously granted Macris' summary judgment motion holding that 
Neways is the successor corporation of Images. Memorandum Decision at pp. 8, 9, attached in 
Addendum; R. 425-26. By holding Neways liable for the judgment against Images, the trial court 
ignored established prima facie res judicata law. See Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 245, 247 
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(Utah 1988); Schaerv. UtahDept. Of Transportation, 657 P.2d 1337, 1340 (Utah 1983); State 
of Utah v. J.T., 877 P.2d 161, 163 (Utah Ct. App. 1994); Copper State Thrift and Loan v. 
Bruno, 735 P.2d 387, 389 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
The undisputed facts demonstrate that Macris could have brought the successor liability 
claim in Macris & Associates v. Images. Images transferred some of its assets to Neways in 
August of 1992. R. 344-49. Although the trial in Macris & Associates v. Images was to 
commence in the end of September 1992, the trial was postponed for two and a half years. R. 
279. Macris learned of Neways' purchase of Images' assets more than two years before trial. R. 
227. Discovery was then reopened until December of 1994. R. 507 p. 12. After discovery 
reopened, Macris' counsel reviewed Neways documentation for three days at Neways' counsel's 
office. R. 298-99, 507 p. 14. Macris could have joined Neways as a party alleging successor 
liability at that time; however, he did not. 
2. Macris should have included the successor liability claim against Neways in the 
Macris & Associates v. Images lawsuit. 
Although Utah courts have never ruled on whether a successor corporation should be 
included in a complaint if the successor corporation existed two years before trial, Utah courts 
have ruled on comparative issues. See Ringwoodv. Foreign Auto Works, 786 P.2d 1350 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1990); Masters v. Worsley, 111 P.2d 499 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). These cases make it 
clear that Macris should have included the successor liability claim against Neways in the first 
action, Macris & Associates v. Images. 
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First, Ringwood v. Foreign Auto Works, 786 P.2d 1350 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), is 
instructive. In Ringwood, the plaintiff was barred from bringing a second action on a claim that 
could have and should have been brought in a previous action against the same defendant but was 
not because of the plaintiffs failure to amend its initial complaint to include the claim. Id. The 
plaintiff attempted to bring an action for breach of contract on a promissory note, which note the 
court determined was merged into a later agreement. Id. at 1358. The original case was 
dismissed on the merits and plaintiff attempted to bring a second action based on breach of the 
agreement, not the promissory note. Id. The court held: 
Since Ringwood failed to assert a claim under the [later] agreement either initially 
or by amendment to his complaint, the case was properly dismissed. Obviously, a 
claim by Ringwood under the [later] agreement could have been decided in the 
prior action, as the agreement was extant and was in default. The only reason it 
was not decided was because Ringwood failed to raise the claim. 
Id 
The Utah Court of Appeals case of Masters v. Worsley, 111 P.2d 499 (Utah Ct. App. 
1989), is also helpful for comparison. In Masters, there was a first action in which a couple 
divorced and the wife received custody of the three minor children, the husband having to pay 
child support for all three. After the first trial, the husband discovered new evidence that cast 
serious doubt as to whether he was the father of the three children. The husband brought another 
action for fraud against his ex-wife, and the trial court dismissed the husband's claim holding that 
res judicata barred the fraud claim. Id. at 500. 
13 
The Utah Court of Appeals reversed holding that the fraud claim "could not have been 
tried" in the first proceedings because the husband had "no knowledge of the alleged facts 
supporting [the fraud] claim" until after the trial. Id. at 503. Consequently, because the husband 
could not have brought the claim, the fraud should not have been alleged in the first action. 
These cases establish that if a plaintiff has knowledge of the facts to support a claim 
against a defendant or the defendant's privy, the doctrine or res judicata requires that the plaintiff 
bring these claims in the existing action. Like Ringwood and unlike Masters, Ringwood had/w// 
knowledge of the facts supporting his claim before trial. Applying these principles, it is clear 
that a successor liability claim could have and should have been brought in a first action, Macris & 
Associates v. Images, to avoid the res judicata application. 
Similarly, Macris could have and should have raised the successor liability claim against 
Images and Neways by simply amending its complaint. Macris knew more than two years before 
the Macris & Associates v. Images trial that Neways may allegedly be the successor to Images. 
R. 227. Macris could have alleged successor liability. Further, Macris should have included its 
successor liability claim against Neways because it had full knowledge of the facts surrounding its 
claim. Successor liability was not alleged because Macris failed to do so; therefore, Macris should 
now be precluded from alleging successor liability by the doctrine of res judicata. 
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C. MACRIS & ASSOCIATES V. IMAGES HAS RESULTED IN A FINAL JUDGMENT 
ON THE MERITS 
The third element of res judicata is also satisfied. On or about the 7th of September, 1995, 
Judge Burningham entered Judgment in the first action, Macris & Associates v. Images, Civil No. 
910400358. "[A] judgment is final for purposes of res judicata until it is reversed on appeal, 
modified, or set aside in the court of rendition." D'Aston v. Aston. 844 P.2d 345, 351 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1992). The Images decision has been affirmed on appeal. See Macris & Associates v. 
Images, 941 P.2d 636 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). Therefore, for the purposes of res judicata, the 
judgment is final. 
D. MACRIS' SECOND LAWSUIT AGAINST NEWAYS VIOLATES THE PUBLIC 
INTEREST. 
The doctrine of res judicata protects the public from multiple, burdensome lawsuits. The 
doctrine has evolved to protect the public interest by "'fostering reliance on prior adjudication', 
'preventing inconsistent judgments', 'relieving parties of the cost and vexation of multiple 
lawsuits', and 'conserving judicial resources'." State of Utah v. J.T., 877 P.2d 161, 162 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1994) (quoting Office of Recovery Servs. v. KG.P., 845 P.2d. 944, 946 (Utah Ct. App. 
1992)); see Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94, 101 S.Ct. 411, 415, 66 L.Ed.2d 308 (1980). 
The second lawsuit, Macris & Associates v. Neways, violates the public policy behind the 
doctrine of res judicata. As mentioned, Macris could have and should have amended its complaint 
to include Neways as a successor corporation of Images. When Macris failed to amend its 
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complaint, Neways did not spend its corporate counsel's efforts to protect itself from a successor 
liability claim. Now, because of Macris' counsel's failure to include Neways, Neways has been 
forced to pay attorney's fees and costs of litigation even though Neways believed that a final 
adjudication in the first lawsuit would and should protect them. Further, both Neways and Macris 
have been forced to pay excessive attorney's fees and Macris' multiple lawsuits have wasted 
judicial resources. Macris should not be awarded for violating the public interest behind the 
doctrine of res judicata. 
Because all three prongs of the res judicata test from Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 245, 
247 (Utah 1988), are satisfied, and because Macris' second action violates the public interest, 
Macris should be barred from bringing a successor liability claim against Neways. Therefore, 
Neways respectfully requests that this Court reverse the trial court's decision and hold that res 
judicata bars Macris' successor liability claim against Neways. 
H. EVEN IF RES JUDICATA DOES NOT BAR MACRIS' SUCCESSOR LIABILITY 
CLAIM, THE TRIAL COURT LACKED SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT A 
FINDING THAT NEWAYS IS IMAGES5 SUCCESSOR CORPORATION 
A. THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY GRANTED SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
The trial court erroneously granted summary judgment against Neways, holding that 
Neways is the successor corporation of Images and should be liable for Images' debt to Macris. 
Summary judgment is only proper if there are no genuine issues of material fact. See Billings v. 
Union Bankers Ins. Co., 819 P.2d 803 (Utah 1991); Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
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Procedure. Further, all inferences are considered in the light most favorable to the non-moving 
party. See Winegar v. Froerer Corp., 813 P.2d 104 (Utah 1991). The trial court based its ruling 
on conflicting evidence before the court. Therefore, genuine issues of material fact existed as to 
whether Neways was in fact Images' successor corporation. 
Utah law is not well established as to the determination of successor liability of 
corporations. Therefore, the trial court adopted a common law definition of successor liability as 
follows: 
The general rule seems to be that where a corporation sells or otherwise transfers 
all of its assets, its transferee is not necessarily liable for the debts and liabilities of 
the transferor. Under some circumstances, the transferee may be held liable for the 
debts of the transferor, to wit: (1) where there is an express or implied assumption 
of liability; (2) where the transaction amounts to a consolidation or merger; (3) 
where the transaction was fraudulent; (4) where some of the elements of a 
purchase in good faith were lacking, as where the transfer was without 
consideration and the creditors of the transferor were not provided for; or (5) 
where the transferee corporation was a mere continuation or reincarnation of the 
old corporation. 
Memorandum Decision at p. 8, attached in Addendum (quoting 49 A.L.R. 3d 881, 883) 
(emphasis added); R. 426. The trial court then held that "it would seem that the transfer from 
Images to Neways would result in successor liability" based on the following two exceptions: (1) 
elements of good faith were lacking because the transfer was without consideration sufficient to 
provide for the creditors; and (2) the new corporation was a continuation of the old corporation. 
Id. at 8, 9; R. 425-26. These findings were erroneous and unsupported by the evidence. 
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B. GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT EXIST REGARDING WHETHER 
NEWAYS SUCCEEDED TO THE OBLIGATIONS OF IMAGES UNDER IMAGES5 
CONTRACT WITH MACRIS. 
1. The contract between Neways and Images does not require Neways to 
assume the obligation Images owed to Macris. 
The trial court erroneously granted summary judgment in favor of Macris because genuine 
issues of material fact exist concerning whether Neways is the successor to Images. Neways did 
not contractually agree to succeed to Images' obligations to Macris under the terms of the Asset 
Purchase Agreement. See Asset Purchase Agreement, attached to Addendum; R. 344-49. 
Therefore, Neways cannot be liable as a successor for the Images judgment. Whether the Asset 
Purchase Agreement between Neways and Images included an assumption by Neways of Images' 
obligation to Macris "depends on the terms of the assignment and the parties' intent." Oquirrh 
Assoc's v. First Nat 7 Leasing Co., 888 P.2d 659, 663 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (quoting Winegar v. 
Froerer Corp., 813 P.2d 104, 108 (Utah 1991)). 
In Oquirrh, the appellant sold real property to the Loiselles. The real property was 
subsequently transferred to different parties through a succession of real estate purchase 
contracts. Upon default of the Oquirrh-Loiselle contract, Oquirrh attempted to recover its 
judgment against Loiselle from several parties, including one entity called Forthcoming. Oquirrh 
asserted that Forthcoming was the successor of the Loiselles, and therefore, contractually bound 
to the terms of the Oquirrh-Loiselle agreement. There, the Utah Court of Appeals held that 
"Forthcoming merely became a successor to the Loiselles' property interest, but absent agreement 
to the contrary, the Loiselles retained their contractual rights and obligations with Oquirrh." Id. 
at 663. 
The Utah Court of Appeals compared the facts in Oquirrh with those in Hansen v. Green 
River Group, 748 P.2d 1102 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), which involved a subpurchase by subcontract 
rather than an assignment. In comparison, the Court stated: 
In Hansen, this court concluded that while a subpurchase did create privity of 
estate between the original vendor and the subpurchaser, it did not create privity of 
contract between them unless the parties so agreed. The parties in this case 
reached no such agreement. 
Oquirrh, 888 P.2d at 663 (citing Hansen, 748 P.2d at 1104, n. 2). Likewise, Neways and Images 
did not reach an agreement for Neways to assume Images' obligations to Macris. Therefore, 
genuine issues of material fact exist as to whether Neways is Images' successor. 
2. The record contains no evidence to support the trial court's finding that the 
transaction between Images and Neways lacked consideration. 
The facts demonstrate that Neways paid valuable consideration for Images. Leslie 
Dee Ann Mower, Vice-president and CFO of Neways, testified by affidavit that "Neways provided 
valuable consideration for the assets it purchased from Images in approximately September of 
1992." R. 323. In addition, the court received no evidence as to if Images or its true successor 
corporation, Eclat, could satisfy the Macris obligation. In fact, the record contains no evidence 
regarding the true successor corporation. Further, the record contains no evidence regarding the 
value of the assets that Neways received from Images. After reviewing the facts in the light most 
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favorable to Neways, there are genuine issues of material fact as to whether Neways gave 
valuable consideration to Images for the assets it purchased and if Images or its true successor, 
Eclat, can satisfy Images' obligation to Macris. Therefore, Neways respectfully requests this 
court to reverse and remand this issue to the trial court so there can be a trial on the merits. 
3. The record contains insufficient evidence to support the trial court's finding 
that Neways is a continuation of Images. 
The trial court erroneously held that Neways is a mere continuation of Images, and 
therefore, is the successor. The trial court found that "Neways consists of substantially the same 
assets, products, oflficers, and employees as Images." Memorandum Decision at p 8, attached in 
Addendum; R. 425. The evidence does not support this finding. 
Leslie Dee Ann Mower testified by affidavit that "Neways did not purchase all of the assets 
of Images." R. 323. However, according to common law, a corporation must purchase all 
assets of the old corporation in order to be the successor corporation. See Memorandum 
Decision at p. 8, attached in Addendum (quoting 49 A.L.R. 3d 881, 883); R. 426. The evidence 
merely established that Neways purchased a portion, not all, of the assets from Images. 
Ms. Mower also testified that "[o]nly one of the three directors of Neways also sits on the 
board of directors for Images." R. 323. Further, the officers and shareholders of Neways and 
Images are not the same. R. 323. The court received no evidence to establish whether or not 
Neways and Images shared the same assets, products, officers, and employees. The trial court 
erroneously supported its findings by citing only to unsupported allegations in Macris' Complaint 
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that were either unequivocally denied in Neways' Answer or refuted in affidavits submitted by 
Neways to oppose Macris' Motion for Summary Judgment. R. 11, 94-5, 280, and 431. This 
lack of evidence creates genuine issues of material fact as to whether Neways is the same 
corporation as Images. This issue should go to a finder of fact. Thus, Neways respectfully 
requests that this Court reverse and remand the issue of Neways as Images' successor to the trial 
court. 
CONCLUSION 
Res judicata bars Macris' successor liability claim against Neways. There is privity 
between Neways and Images, Macris could have and should have brought the successor liability 
claim against Neways in the first action, and there has been a final judgment on the merits of the 
first action. Therefore, Neways respectfully requests this Court to reverse the trial court's 
decision and hold that the doctrine of res judicata bars Macris' successor liability claim. 
In the alternative, if this Court finds that res judicata does not bar the successor liability 
claim, then Neways respectfully requests that this Court reverse and remand the successor liability 
claim to the trial court to allow the parties an opportunity to present evidence regarding the true 
successor to Images. 
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ADDENDUM 
F I L E D 
Fourth Judicial District Court of 
Utah County, State of Utah. 
CARMA B.SMITH, Clerk 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COUR&^W// /?/#£««.... 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH I J W 
MACRIS & ASSOCIATES, INC., 1 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
NEW AYS, INC., THOMAS E. MOWER, 
and LESLIE D. MOWER, 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
CASE NO. 950400093CN 
DATE: September 19, 1997 
JUDGE: HOWARD H. MAETANI 
This matter came before the Court on Defendants', Neways, Inc., Thomas Mower, and 
Leslie Mower, Motion for Summary Judgment, pursuant to the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
Rule 56(b), filed on or about October 16, 1995, and on Plaintiffs, Macris & Associates, Inc., 
Cross Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, pursuant to the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
Rule 56(a), filed on or about November 14, 1995. The Honorable Howard H. Maetani, 
Fourth District Court Judge, heard oral arguments on January 29, 1996, and stayed rulings on 
the motions before the Court pending a ruling by the Utah Court of Appeals on the appeal of 
a judgment in favor of Macris & Associates and Michael Macris in their lawsuit against 
Images, Inc., the predecessor corporation to Neways, Inc. The Court of Appeals rejected 
every argument raised on appeal and affirmed the judgment against Images, Inc. Dennis K. 
Poole and Andrea Nuffer represent Defendants, Neways, Inc., Thomas Mower, and Leslie 
Mower. Plaintiff, Macris & Associates, Inc., is represented by Thomas R. Karrenberg, Nathan 
B. Wilcox, and Jon V. Harper. This matter has again come before the Court through 
Plaintiffs Notice to Submit for Ruling, filed on September 3, 1997, by Plaintiffs new counsel, 
/ I Q Q 
Stephen T. Hard of Giauque, Crockett, Bendinger & Peterson. The Court has reviewed the 
file, considered the memoranda of counsel, and heard oral arguments, and upon being advised 
in the premises, now makes the following: 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
I 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The plaintiff, Macris & Associates, Inc. ("Macris"), is a Utah Corporation and at one 
time was a distributor for Images & Attitude, Inc. ("Images"), a Utah Corporation formerly 
engaged in multilevel marketing. See Complaint ffi[ 7, 7, 11. 
On or about August 1989, Macris entered into a distributorship agreement with Images 
and the parties agreed to allow Macris to have automatic qualification of its distributorship, 
and attached this provision to the agreement through the Addendum to Distributor 
Application. See Complaint ^ 12. 
Pursuant to the Addendum Agreement, Macris agreed to use its time, marketing 
expertise and contacts to build a downline organization within Images' multilevel program. 
For this commitment, Images agreed to pay Macris at the highest level of Images' marketing 
program for product sales made by the distributors in the Macris downline. See Complaint ffl[ 
73, 14. 
On or about March 7, 1991, Macris received a letter from Images claiming that Macris 
was not sufficiently active and suspended the Auto Qualification Agreement, and subsequently 
terminated Macris as an Images distributor. See Complaint ^ 22. 
On or about April 17, 1991, Macris filed a lawsuit (Civil Case No. 910400358) against 
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Images and Thomas E. Mower for breach of contract, seeking relief in the form of damages 
worth the payments it would have received from Images but for the termination of the 
distributorship agreement. See Complaint ^ 23. 
Neways, Inc. ("Neways"), a Utah corporation, engaged in multilevel marketing and 
sale of health and beauty products, was incorporated in Utah on or about August 1992, with 
Thomas E. Mower as president and Leslie Mower as vice-president. See Complaint ffl[ 2, 9. 
In early September, 1992, Images transferred substantially all its assets to Neways, 
discontinuing its multilevel marketing business, at which time Neways took over the 
multilevel marketing operation, using the same facilities, with the same employees, selling the 
same products through essentially the same network of distributors. See Defendants' 
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment ^ JO; Plaintiff's Memorandum in 
Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment f 3; Maoris v. Images Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law \J7. 
On or about September 15, 1995, the Fourth District Court of Utah County, Judge Guy 
R. Burningham presiding, entered a Judgment against Images on Macris & Associates' cause 
of action for breach of contract An appeal to this decision was filed on or about February 12, 
1996. See Defendants' Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment ^ J4. 
On or about February 15, 1995, Plaintiff filed a complaint with the court of Judge 
Boyd L. Park, alleging fraudulent transfer, successor liability, and alter ego. See Complaint 
ffl[ 30, 38, 45. 
Based on these causes of action, Plaintiff asks to be awarded: punitive damages, 
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general damages from Thomas E. and Leslie Mower, an Order partially voiding the transfer 
from Images to Neways, and an Order making Thomas E. Mower, Leslie Mower, and Neways 
liable for commissions to Macris had its distributorship also been transferred to Neways. See 
Complaint Prayer for Relief ffif 1, 2, 3, 4. 
On or about October 17, 1995, Defendants filed Defendant Neways, Inc. Motion For 
Summary Judgment with an accompanying Memorandum In Support Of Motion For Summary 
Judgment filed on or about October 19, 1995, claiming that res judicata bars the plaintiff from 
recovering on its claims. 
On or about November 13, 1995, Plaintiff, Macris & Associates, Inc., filed Plaintiff's 
Memorandum In Opposition To Motion For Summary Judgment. 
On or about November 14, 1995, Defendants filed their Reply Memorandum In 
Support Of Defendants' Motion For Summary Judgment. 
On or about November 14, 1995, Plaintiff filed Plaintiff Macris & Associates, Inc. 
Motion for Summary Judgment with an accompanying Memorandum In Support of Motion 
For Summary Judgment. 
On or about November 24, 1995, Defendants filed a Memorandum In Opposition To 
Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
On or about November 28, 1995, the current action was transferred from Judge Park to 
Judge Howard H. Maetani, pursuant to the 4th District Court's decision to reassign some 
cases. 
On or about December 7, 1995, Plaintiff filed a Reply Memorandum In Support Of 
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Motion For Partial Summary Judgment. 
Oral arguments were heard on the motions on or about January 29, 1996 in front of 
Judge Maetani. 
A Stay of the Proceedings was entered on or about February 21, 1996, pending the 
completion of all appeals in the previous case. 
On September 3, 1997, Plaintiff filed a Notice to Submit for Ruling, following the 
completion of all appeals in the previous case. 
n 
STANDARD FOR MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 56(a) and (b), a party against whom a 
claim has been made, may at any time move for a summary judgment in his favor. The 
motion should be granted if ". . . the pleadings, deposition, answers to interrogatories, and 
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as 
to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." 
URCP Rule 56(c). 
m 
ISSUES 
Defendants argue that the current action is barred by res judicata, claiming that the 
three elements have been met, in that; the parties are the same, the claim was or could have 
been presented in the first suit, and that there was a final judgment on the merits. For the 
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sake of this argument, Defendants acknowledge that Neways is in privy with Images, but 
contend that this does not make Neways the alter ego of Images, and that there is no 
successor liability attached to the acknowledgment. 
Plaintiff contends that the elements of res judicata have not all been met, that Neways 
and Images are not the same parties, the claims are such that they should not have been 
brought into the first action, and that as the previous decision is being appealed, there has not 
been a final judgment. However, as Defendants have acknowledged the privity between 
Neways and Images, Plaintiff argues that it is entitled to a judgment on its claim for successor 
liability as a matter of law. 
IV 
ANALYSIS 
Claims are barred from being litigated by res judicata when the following three 
elements are satisfied: 
First, both cases must involve the same parties or their privies. Second, the 
claim that is alleged to be barred must have been presented in the first suit or 
must be one that could and should have been raised in the first action. Third, 
the first suit must have resulted in a final judgment on the merits. 
Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 245, 247 (Utah 1988). 
A. PRIVITY BETWEEN NEWAYS AND IMAGES 
"The legal definition of a person in privity with another, is a person so identified in 
interest with another that he represents the same legal right." Searle Bros, v. Searle. 588 P.2d 
689, 691 (Utah 1978). Neways has acknowledged that there is privity between itself and 
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Images for the purpose of proving res judicata, but denies that this in any way proves 
successor liability. Macris refuses to accept Neways' acknowledgment of privity for res 
judicata, but then uses it to claim successor liability as a matter of law. 
If it is established that Neways is a "successor in interest of property that is the 
subject of pending litigation to which his transferor is bound" then the transferee is "entitled 
to the benefits of the rules of res judicata to the same extent as [its] transferor . . .." 
Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 44 (1982); Golden State Bottling Co. Inc. v. National 
Labor Relations Board. 414 U.S. 168, 179 (1973). Thus, as Neways is the successor in 
interest of the property that Images would have used to pay damages to Macris, Neways is 
entitled to argue res judicata to the same extent as Images. 
Although Utah has not yet addressed the issue of generally establishing successor 
liability of corporations, a number of jurisdictions have well established rules in common. See 
Williams v. Bowman Livestock Equipment Co., 927 F.2d 1128,1131 (10th Cir. 1991) (a 
creditor based his claim against a corporation on successor liability, but the court ruled 
against him because "a prerequisite for the imposition of liability against a corporation as a 
mere continuation of a predecessor is a sale or transfer of all, or substantially all, the assets of 
the latter to the former."); Kloberdanz v. Jov Manufacturing Co., 288 F. Supp. 817 (D. Co. 
1968) (a company that purchased assets from a liable company was found to be not 
responsible because there was no hint of fraud, the transfer was made for a good 
consideration, and there was no connection between the two companies, such as officers or 
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stockholders); Koch v. Speedwell Motor Car Co., 140 P. 598 (Cal. App. 1914) (the court 
states that when a new corporation is merely a continuation of an old corporation, the new 
will be held liable for the debts of the old) ; Evanston Insurance Co. v. Luko, 783 P.2d 293 
(Haw. App. 1989) (owners of a liable company formed a new company, but the new company 
was not liable as there was no transfer of assets; the court stated that successor liability 
presupposes a transfer of assets, and its intent is that the "rights of creditors are 'protected 
against a sale , transfer, or distribution of all the corporate property* in fraud of their rights. 
18B Am. Jur. 2d Corporations § 2086 at 914 (1985)." A representation of what the common 
reasoning is behind successor liability is located in 49 A.L.R. 3d 881, 883: 
The general rule seems to be that where a corporation sells or otherwise 
transfers all of its assets, its transferee is not necessarily liable for the debts and 
liabilities of the transferor. Under some circumstances, the transferee may be 
held liable for the debts of the transferor, to wit: (1) where there is an express 
or implied assumption of liability; (2) where the transaction amounts to a 
consolidation or merger; (3) where the transaction was fraudulent; (4) where 
some of the elements of a purchase in good faith were lacking, as where the 
transfer was without consideration and the creditors of the transferor were not 
provided for; or (5) where the transferee corporation was a mere continuation 
or reincarnation of the old corporation. 
In the current action, it would seem that the transfer from Images to Neways would 
result in successor liability based on two of the exceptions. First, if as a result of the transfer, 
Images is unable to meet its obligation to Macris, it would indicate that some of the elements 
of a purchase in good faith were lacking in that the transfer was without consideration 
sufficient to provide for the creditors. In Malone v. Red Top Cab Co., 60 P.2d 543 (Cal. 
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App. 1936), the court held that in the case where one corporation takes all the assets of 
another corporation without passing any other property or cash to the selling corporation that 
could be used to meet any creditor's claim, the purchaser will be obligated to take 
responsibility for the seller's debts. Second, as Neways consists of substantially the same 
assets, products, officers, and employees as Images, it would seem that Neways is in fact a 
mere continuation of the same corporation. In G. P. Publications. Inc. v. Ouebecor Printing— 
St. Paul. Inc. 481 S.E.2d 674 (N.C.App. 1997), the Court considered several factors in 
determining the applicability of successor liability, including whether there is identity of 
stockholders and directors between two corporations. "This...encompasses the situation where 
one corporation sells its assets to another with the same people owning both corporations." 
Id. at 680, quoting Ninth Ave. Remedial Group v. AUis-Chalmers Corp.. 195 B.R. 716, 724 
(N.D. Ind. 1996) (citing U.S. v. Carolina Transformer Co.. 978 F.2d 832, 838 (4th Cir. 1992). 
Therefore, the court finds that Images and Neways are in privity with one another and 
that the element of res judicata has been met in barring a claim for further damages. 
However, the court finds that Neways does fall into the exceptions to the general rule on 
successor liability, and is responsible for meeting the obligation Images currently owes to 
Maoris. 
B. NEWNESS OF CLAIMS BROUGHT IN THE CURRENT ACTION 
In both the previous and the current action, claims have arisen from a single breach of 
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a single contract, and in the first suit, Macris was awarded damages for that breach. Macris 
knew about the creation of Neways before the conclusion of the previous trial, and could have 
asked to include Neways in its earning projections if it felt such action was necessary to 
obtain sufficient relief from the breach of contract. 
Basing a new claim for relief, from a previously adjudicated injury, on different issues, 
will not avoid res judicata. "Seeking the same or approximately the same relief but adducing 
a different substantive law premise or ground . . . does not constitute the presentation of a 
new claim when the new premise is related to the same transaction or series of transactions 
and accordingly the second action should be held barred." Berry v. Berry, 738 P.2d 246, 248 
(Utah 1987) (quoting from the Restatement 2d of Judgments § 25 comment d (1982)). 
As Macris knew of the transfer from Images to Neways before the conclusion of the 
previous action, Macris cannot now present a claim for new damages, based on the fact that 
there was a transfer of assets, when the injury is the same as before. 
Typically, even when the injury caused by an actionable wrong extends into the 
future and will be felt beyond the date of judgment, the damages awarded by 
the judgment are nevertheless supposed to embody the money equivalent of the 
entire injury. Accordingly, if a plaintiff who has recovered a judgment against 
a defendant in a certain amount becomes dissatisfied with his recovery and 
commences a second action to obtain increased damages, the court will hold 
him precluded . . . 
Restatement 2d of Judgments § 25 comment c (1982). 
In National Finance Co. of Provo v. Dalev. 382 P.2d 405 (Utah 1963), the Utah 
Supreme Court adopted this reasoning, saying: 
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In our judgment it better comports with the orderly processes of justice to 
require the plaintiff to bear the responsibility of pleading, proving and claiming 
the full benefit of whatever character of cause of action he possesses in the 
original action and of being bound thereby, than to allow another trial to come 
upon the same cause of action raising issues which could have been dealt with 
in the original action. 
Because of Macris' knowledge of the transfer of Images' assets to Neways, the issue of 
damages in addition to those previously awarded should have been included in the first action. 
Plaintiff argues that the claims brought forth in the current action are a result of a new 
injury, namely Neways failure to make payments to Macris under the terms of the agreement 
between Macris and Images. It would seem that it is plaintiffs contention that the 
distributorship agreement between the parties continued to exist beyond the date of the breach 
of the contract, and as such, was included in the transfer of assets from Images to Neways. 
In fact, it would not be appropriate for plaintiff to receive damages, that are intended 
to make him whole, for a breached contract and then seek to have that same agreement 
performed. 
Whenever there is a total breach of a contract by one party to it, the other is at liberty to 
treat the contract as broken and desist from any further effort on his part to perform it. In 
other words, he may abandon it and recover, as damages for the breach, the benefits he 
would have received by a full performance. . . . Where a contract is thus abandoned, the 
primary right to further performance of the promise of the other party is discharged and is 
replaced by a remedial right to damages for nonperformance. 
17A AM. JUR. 2D Contracts § 726. In the suit between Macris and Images, Macris sought 
and was awarded damages for breach of contract. Because of this, Macris must be denied in 
its current attempt to claim that Neways has failed to perform under the same contract for 
11 
which there was already found to have been a breach. 
Macris knew of the transfer from Images to Neways before the conclusion of the first 
action, and could have raised question regarding it in that suit As such, the court finds that 
the second element of res judicata has been satisfied in that the issues in the current suit 
could and should have been brought forward in the previous action. 
C. FINAL JUDGMENT ON THE MERITS 
The plaintiff argues that as the first action is being appealed, there has not yet been a 
final judgment. In D'Aston v. Aston. 844 P.2d 345,351 (Ut. App. 1992), the court stated that 
"a judgment is final for purposes of res judicata until it is reversed on appeal, modified, or set 
aside in the court of rendition." Because the judgment in the previous suit has not been 
reversed, this element of res judicata is satisfied. 
V 
DECISION 
As discussed in the above analysis, the court finds that the elements of res judicata 
have been satisfied, thus barring Plaintiffs claims for further damages from Neways as a 
result of the breached contract with Images. However, the court also finds that Neways is the 
successor of Images and is liable for the previous judgment against Images. 
Therefore, the court GRANTS Defendants', Neways, Inc., Thomas E. Mower, and 
Leslie D. Mower, Motion for Summary Judgment as to any claim for new damages. 
12 
4 
The court also GRANTS a Partial Summary Judgment to the Plaintiff, Macris & 
Associates, Inc., making Neways, as Images' successor, liable for the previous judgment 
against Images. 
Counsel for the Plaintiff, Macris & Associates, Inc., is instructed to prepare an Order 
consistent with this Decision. 
Dated at Provo, Utah this 19th day of September, 1997. 
^ ^ g T T ^ ^ ^ ^ 
HOWARCLH^IAETANI 
Fourth District Court Judge 
cc:\ Dennis K. Poole, Esq. 
Andrea Nuffer, Esq. 
Roger D. Sandack 
Stephen T. Hard 
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ASSET PURCHASE AGREEMENT 
AGREEMENT made this 31st day of August, 1992 between Images 
and Attitude, Inc., a corporation organized under the laws of the 
State of Utah and having its principle place of business at 150 
East 400 North, Salemf Utah (hereinafter referred to as Seller) and 
NEWAYS, Inc. a corporation organized under the laws of the state of 
Utah (hereinafter referred to as Buyer). 
Buyer desires to acquire and Seller desires to sell the assets 
of Seller subject to the Seller's liability, as more fully shown by 
the financial records attached hereto and by reference made a part 
hereof as Exhibit "A", for good and valuable consideration. 
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the promises and mutual 
covenants, undertakings, and agreements hereinafter contained and 
subject to the terms and conditions hereof, the parties agree as 
follows: 
SECTION 1 
ACQUISITION OF ASSETS: Buyer shall acquire, as of the closing 
date, all of the assets subject to the liability of Seller listed 
in Exhibit "B" attached hereto and by reference made a part hereof, 
which liability Buyer assumes and agrees to pay as shown by the 
financial records attached hereto and as may be changed in the 
ordinary operation of Seller prior to closing date. 
SECTION 2 
PURCHASE PRICE: Buyer, in consideration of the covenants, 
conditions, and representations of Seller, recited herein, shall 
pay to Seller the purchase price of $1,700,000 which is allocated 
as agreed by the parties hereto and payable as more fully described 
in Exhibit "C". 
SECTION 3 
WARRANTY AND COVENANTS OF SELLER: Seller agrees, represents 
and warrants as follows: 
(a) Seller is duly incorporated and authorized to do business 
under the laws of the state of Utah. 
(b) The execution of this agreement has been duly authorized 
by Seller's Board of Directors. 
(c) Seller shall use its best efforts to obtain, on or before 
September 15, 1992, the approval of its shareholders of the terms 
and condition of this agreement and of the nature and amount of the 
consideration to be received by Seller hereunder. 
(d) The financial statements of Seller attached to this 
agreement as Exhibit "A" made a part hereof by reference, fully and 
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correctly reflect the financial condition, assets and liabilities, 
and operations of Seller as of the dates stated in such documents. 
(e) The list of accounts and notes receivable, attached 
hereto as Exhibit "D" and by reference made a part hereof, is 
complete as of this date- Any accounts or notes receivable so 
listed or acquired by Seller before the closing date or not fully 
paid when due, Seller agrees to pay them in full upon written 
notice by Buyer of any default provided the Seller's liability 
shall be limited to the amount exceeding the reserve shown in 
Sellers balance sheet. 
(f) Seller has good and marketable title to all assets and 
property sold hereunder, except as otherwise stated in the Exhibits 
attached hereto and except for property disposed of or encumbered 
in the ordinary course of business. All tangible properties sold 
hereunder are in good condition and repair and conform to all 
applicable zoning, building, safety and other regulations. 
(g) Attached hereto is Exhibit "F" and by reference made a 
part hereof is a list of insurance policies in respect to the 
Seller's property and business as to the date of this agreement. 
Seller agrees to continue this insurance or insurance with similar 
coverage until the closing date. 
(h) Seller agrees to use its best efforts to obtain in the 
necessary consents the assignment or transfer of any contract, 
lease, license, or permit to be assigned or transferred hereunder, 
enter performance duties under such contracts, leases, licenses, 
and permits without default until the closing date. 
(i) Seller agrees to disclose to Buyer no later than five 
days after the closing date, all trade secrets, customer lists, and 
technical information held or controlled by Seller in relation to 
the business sold hereunder. Buyer shall not have t&e right to use 
the name Images and Attitude or any variation thereof in the United 
States or any other country. 
(j) Until the closing date of this agreement, Seller shall 
not at the written consent of Buyer, disclose, dispose of or 
encumber any of the assets or property sold hereunder with the 
exception of transactions occurring in the ordinary course of 
Seller's business. Seller shall use its best efforts to preserve 
its business and good will. Seller further agrees to permit Buyer 
and its representatives full access to its property and records any 
time prior to the closing date during normal business hours and to 
2 
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supply all information concerning its property and affairs as Buyer 
may reasonably demand. 
SECTION 4 
WARRANTIES OF BUYER: Buyer represents and warrants to Seller as 
follows: 
(a) Buyer is a corporation existing under and doing business 
by virtue of the laws of the state of Utah, and that it is duly 
organized and a validly existing corporation. 
(b) The Board of Directors of Buyer authorize the execution 
of this agreement. 
SECTION 5 
INDEMNIFICATION OF PARTIES; Except as otherwise expressly provided 
in this agreement, Seller sliall indemnify Buyer against any 
liability connected with the assets or business sold hereunder 
occurring as a result of acts or omissions occurring before the 
closing date, and Buyer shall indemnify Seller against any and all 
liability occurring as a result of acts or omissions occurring 
after the closing date. Each party to this agreement shall 
cooperate with the other party in defending claims for which the 
other party is or may be liable under this provision by giving 
notice to the other party of the exertionary existence of such 
claim by furnishing such documents and information as may be useful 
in the defense of such claim. 
SECTION 6 
TRANSFER OF TITLE AND RISK OF LOSS: Title to the property and 
assets sold hereunder shall be passed to Buyer on the closing date 
and delivery to it of the proper instruments of transfer. If at 
any time, any of the tangible property sold hereunder shall have 
been lost or damaged, except for the damage or the loss through use 
and wear in the ordinary course of business, by any cause or event 
beyond the reasonable power and control of Seller, Buyer shall be 
entitled to collect all insurance proceeds collectable by reason of 
such loss or damage or, if the amount of loss or damage exceeds 50 
percent of the value of the property, Buyer shall have the right to 
elect to complete the sale and collect all insurance proceeds or 
terminate this agreement in lieu of any other right or remedy. 
Buyer becomes entitled to collect insurance under this provision, 
3 
a purchase price of lost or damaged assets covered by insurance 
nail not be reduced. 
SECTION 7 
IMPOSSIBILITY OF PERFORMANCE: if, except as otherwise provided 
herein, either party shall be prevented from completing the sale, 
for any cause beyond its reasonable power and control, the other 
party may elect to except partial performance or, in lieu of any 
other remedy, elect to terminate this agreement. 
SECTION 8 
SALES AND USE TAX: Any sales and use tax payable by reason of the 
sale by any of the assets under this agreement shall be paid by 
Buyer, and such payment shall not be construed as part of the 
purchase price. Seller agrees to furnish to Buyer resale 
certificates for any items sold to Buyer for resale. Seller shall 
also obtain and deliver to Buyer a clearance receipt if requested 
of the states where Seller has transacted business for sales and 
use taxes due from Seller. 
SECTION 9 
INVENTORY OF GOODS TO BE SOLD; Inventory of all stock in trade, 
suppliers common fixtures, furnishings and equipment shall be taken 
on or about September 1, 1992. Inventory of Seller's stock in 
trade shall set forth the value for which items are to be sold 
under this agreement based on Sellers actual cost for each item. 
SECTION 10 
DISPOSITION OF RECORDS AND DOCUMENTS: Seller shall retain title to 
its documents and records, except those agreed to be transferred 
under this agreement. Any such documents or records that Buyer may 
reasonably require after the closing date for use in connection 
with the assets sold hereunder shall be delivered or made available 
to Buyer. Each party shall forward to the other party all 
correspondence, documents or payments relating to the assets sold 
hereunder to which the other party is entitled under the terms of 
this agreement. Before destroying any records or papers connected 
with the assets sold hereunder, each party shall first offer them 
to the other party. 
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SECTION 11 
COSTS: Buyer shall bear the costs incidental to the sale hereunder 
in accordance with prevailing custom, 
SECTION 12 
INTERPRETATION OF AGREEMENT: 
(a) There are no agreements, warranties, or representations, 
express or implied except those expressly set forth herein• All 
agreements, representations and warranties contained in this 
agreement shall apply as of the closing date shall survive the 
closing of this agreement. 
(b) This agreement shall not be assignable by Buyer without 
written consent of Seller subject to this provision, this agreement 
shall be binding on and benefit the successors and assignee of the 
parties. 
(c) This agreement is to be governed by and construed under 
the laws of the state of Utah. 
SECTION 13 
ACCOUNTS RECEIVABLE: This sale does not include any of Seller's 
accounts or notes receivable, all of which shall remain Seller's 
property. If, following the close of this sale. Buyer shall 
collect any of Seller's accounts or notes receivable, Buyer shall 
promptly remit the proceeds to Seller. 
SECTION 14 
DOCUMENTS TO BE DELIVERED BY SELLER AT CLOSINGz At Closing, Seller 
shall deliver to Buyer, properly executed, the following documents: 
(a) A Bill of Sale with warranties and Affidavits of Title 
and all other instruments that are reasonably required by the 
Seller to transfer to the Buyer the asset of the business described 
in the agreement, free of all encumbrances except as disclosed. 
SECTION 15 
COMPLIANCE WITH BULK SALES LAW: In Compliance with Article Six of 
the Uniform Commercial Code of the state of Utah, Seller shall 
prepare and deliver to Buyer at the closing, a list of Seller's 
5 
creditors. The list shall be signed and sworn to or affirmed by-
Seller's agent. List shall contain the names, business addresses of 
all Seller's creditors, the amounts owed to them if known and the 
names and business addresses of all parties known by Seller who 
assert a claim against Seller even if the claims are disputed. The 
Seller has operated the business in its present location for more 
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EXHIBIT A 
FINANCIAL RECORDS OF SELLER 
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IMAGES S ATTITUDES, INC. 
BALANCE SHEET AS OF 08 /31 /92 
ASSETS 
CURRENT ASSETS 
CREDIT CARD CLEARING-FSB 
FSB SUEEP 
CONVENTION ACCOUNT 










ACCOUNTS RECEIVABLE - TRAOE 
ACCOUNTS REC. - NEW ZEALANO 
ACCOUNTS REC. - MALAYSIA 
ACCOUNTS REC. - HONG KONG 





TOTAL CURRENT ASSETS 
PROPERTY S EQUIPMENT 
OFFICE FURNITURE 
LESS: ACCUMULATED DEPRECIATION 
TELEPHONE EQUIPMENT 
LESS: ACCUMULATED DEPRECIATION 
OFFICE EQUIPMENT 
LESS: ACCUMULATED DEPRECIATION 
COMPUTER HARDWARE 




LESS: ACCUMULATED DEPRECIATION 
VEHICLES 














































TOTAL ASSETS 1.316,058.69 
IMAGES £ ATTITUOES. INC. 
8ALANCE SHEET AS OF 08/31/92 
LIABILITIES 5 STOCKHOLDERS EQUITY 
CURRENT LIABILITIES 
ACCOUNTS PAYABLE - TRAOE 
ACCRUEO PAYROLL 
ACCRUED EMPLOYER P/R TAXES 
ACCRUED BONUSES 






LONG TERM DEBT 
NOTE PAY-CANAOA 
NOTE PAY-AUSTRALIA 
NOTE PAY-NEW ZEALAND 
NOTE PAY-PUERTO RICO 
NOTE PAY-KOREA 




NET INCOME OR LOSS (-) 











TOTAL LIABILITIES & STOCKHOLDERS EQUITY 1,316,058.69 
IMAGES S ATTITUDES. INC. 









EMPLOYER PORTION - SOC SEC TAX 
FEDERAL UNEMPLOYMENT TAX 
STATE UNEMPLOYMENT TAX 
LIFE INSURANCE 







TRAVEL & ENTERTAINMENT 
MEALS NON-ENTERTAINMENT 
TRAVEL OTHER 
REPAIRS S MAINTENANCE 
DUES ANO SUBSCRIPTIONS 
PROOUCT LIABILITY 
WORKMAN'S COMP INSURANCE 
LEGAL FEES 
















REPAIRS S MAINTENANCE 
UTILITIES 
SUPPLIES 








































































































































































IMAGES & ATTITUOES, INC. 












WAREHOUSE S OELIVERY 
PAYROLL-WAREHOUSE 
FEDERAL UNEMPLOYMENT TAX 
GROUP HEALTH INSURANCE 






GAS S OIL 




RESEARCH & DEV.-PRODUCT 















































































































TOTAL WAREHOUSE S DELIVERY 
TOTAL OPERATING EXPENSES 
NET PROFIT OR LOSS (-) 
60,730.15 14.2 734,800.63 16.3 
235,852.64 55.2 2.368,547.64 52.5 
62.184.74- 14.5- .331,459.84- 7.3-
EXHIBIT B 
LIST OF ASSETS PURCHASED 
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VHE TRUCK, RED 1989 
VHE TRUCK, 6RAY i RED 1998 
VHE UNCCLN, WHITE 1998 















































IMAGES I ATTITUDES, INC. 
FIXED ASSETS-WAREHOUSE EQUIPMENT 
0 8 / 3 1 / 9 2 
EQUIPMENT QUANT. 
EXHAUST CLEANING SYSTEM 
BOILER, (PARKER) 
MACHINE, FILLER, MINI FOUR 
MACHINE, LABELER, COSMOS MOTORIZED 
INCUBATOR, SCIENCE TEACHING 
HEATER, LARGE, FROM CEILING 
CERAMIC DRYER, SERIAL « 888128 
MIXER, 2 1/2 HORSEPOWER 
MIXER, KITCHEN AID 
MACHINE, SILK SCREEN, ALPINE INDUST 
UV TESTER ] 
SCALE BALANCE, SCIENTIFIC 1 
MACHINE, FILLER, RESINA 1 
AIR CONDITIONER, PORTABLE 1 
REFERIGERATOR, FOR CHEMICALS 1 
MACHINE, LABELER, MASTER (UNUSED) 1 
MACHINE, FILLER, SIMPLEX c 
MIXER, 3 PHASE 1 
VAT, 206 GAL, STAINLESS STEEL 1 
MIXER, PLATFORM 1 
TABLES, STAINLESS STEEL < 
HYDROGENATOR 1 
FAN, UPRIGHT, 6 FT 1 
SCALE BALANCE, SARTORIUS 1 
UPRIGHTS, METAL 68 
MACHINE, LABELER, AVERY 1 
MACHINE, SHRINK WRAP, BESELER *T -14 1 
MACHINE, FILLING, ELF, VIBRANT 1 
MIXER, HOMOGENIZER 1 
SCALE, SHIP MANIFEST, N3S25 1 
VAT, 350 SAL, STAINLESS STEEL 1 
MACHINE, FILLER, MINI SIX 1 
VAT, 350 GAL, PLASTICS 1 
MIXER, 5 HP 1 
PALLET JACK, FORK TRUCK, 5100 1 
TANK, PRODUCT 1 
SCALE, HOBART, #41-3132, GRAY, WORK 1 
GRAVITY FLOW BAYS 12 
SNOW PLCW & ATTACHMENTS (#59318IFA) 1 
FORK L IFT , NISSAN 1 
VISCOMETER 1 
MACHINE, SHRINK WRAP, X-RITE 710 1 
SCALE, ACCULAB, ELECTRONIC DIGITAL 2 
ROTOVAP, MODEL 011 (#59269) 1 
SINK, STAINLESS STEEL, 3 TUBS 2 
HEATER, PORTA-HEATER 1 
WELDER, SONIC 1 
AIR COMPRESSOR, 5HP 1 
PURCHASE 
1 8 8 - 1 1 
1 8 9 - 0 2 
1 8 9 - 1 1 
1 8 9 - 1 1 
1 8 9 - 1 1 
2 9 0 - 0 2 






























































I f OOv« 9o 
I f O0Va Ov 






Of 000* 00 
If 8W« 00 
2,433.13 
If o&6» CV 
6,630.d0 







3f JVV* 00 
270.00 















































































































































































































MACHINE, CAP TIBHTNER, ELF 
CONVEYER, SHIPPING ! 
ENCODER, ACCUPRINT ] 
MACHINE, CAPPER, RESINA 1 
MACHINE, LABELER, COSMOS MOTORIZE}} 1 
CW 1 1992 FIXED ASSETS 
1487 EJ MCKERNQN 
3225 VACUUM DISTILLATION UNIT 
3618 WES6UIDESCCPE 
3615 REACTOR 
4602 MISC. R i D EQUIPMENT FOR LAB 
3148 HEAT VAT i STAND 
3194 VISCOMETER 
1674 PALLET JACKS 















3f J&O* 00 




































































167,734.36 2,795.57 28,659.23 122,540.48 
IMAGES t ATTITUDES 
FIXED ASSETS-CDWTER SOFTWARE 
8 8 / 3 1 / 9 2 















































1 | OW« w 
21,246.76 
2247 CS WRQ-REFLECT 
2369 CS PAGEMASTER, DISPLAY SERVER 
2221 CS BROCK SOFTWARE 
2615 CS BROCX SOFTWARE 
1756 CS 28/21 SOFTWARE 
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INAGEB I ATTITUDE, D C 




















































FILE UNITS, TAB, ALMOND, 6 SHELVES 
DESK, BROUN, 4 DRAWERS, L SHAPED 
DESK, EXEC, DRK BROUN 
DESK, EXEC, TAN, CORNER 
TABLE, BROUN TOP 
DESK, H E E L S , BLACK 
MICROWAVE, ANANA RADARAGE, SILVER 
DESK, EXEC, BLACK DRW, WALNUT TOP 
DESK, EXEC., BLACK 
TABLE, SIMULATED OAK, CONF. STYLE 
DESK, EXEC., DARK WALNUT 
TABLE, CONFERENCE, HOOD 
FILE CABINET, 4 OUR, LEBAL, TAN 
DESK, NARBLE LOOK, PINK 
TABLE, COFFEE, SLABS TOP, METAL 
OVEN/RANEE, WHIRLPOOL, UNITE 
DESK, EXEC, WOOD 
DESK, BROUN TOP, METAL, TAN OURS 
TABLE, 3 DURE, HOOD 
I ^ B A M I S M N V M C ^WW^WW ^RMAM M n V w n 
PRINTER STAND, METAL, BLACK, LARGE 
REFRIGERATOR, SHALL, SQUARE 
SAFE, BRAY BOX, SENTRY 1 1 5 8 
CHAIR, EXEC, HIGH BACK, WOOD, BLUE 
REFRIGERATOR, SEARS COLDSPOT, BROUN 
DESK, BROUN SIMULATED HOOD 
COUCH, UNITE, 2 PILLOWS 
DISPLAY CASE, GLASS, 5 LEVEL 
TABLE, END, SLABS TOP, BRABB 
DISHWASHER, NRYTAB, LST TAN 
DESK, EXEC, BROUN WOOD 
MICROWAVE, L08ICX, UNITE, BLACK 
TABLE, OAK, RECTANGLE 
DESK, BROUN TOP 1 METAL DWR8, CORNS 
CHAIRS, OFF UNITE, OAK HOOD, UHEELS 
CHAIR, VICTORIAN, CHERRY HOOD 
DESK, TAN TOP, METAL, BLACK DURB 
TABLE, FOLD UP, METAL, WALNUT TOP 
DESK, BROW 
TABLE, CONFERENCE, NED BROUN 
BOOKCASE, ALL HOOD, BROUN 
CHAIR, EXEC, LEATHER, BROUN 
DESK, EXEC, DARKUALNUT 
CHAIRS, H U B , TAN 
UDRKSTRTIOB, HIGH, PEACH 
TABLE, NARBLE LOOK, PINK, LOW 
DESK, EXEC, HRLWr TOP, METAL, TAN 
































9 **» l%g C JU W 
1 96-46 





















































































































































































































































































TABLE, Bf tMi , R0UNDLES8 
CABINET, 2 DWS, TAN, METAL, LOCKS 
DESK, LOT BROW TOP, S DRU3 
CHAIR, EXEC, 6RAY, WHEELS, ARMS 
DESK* EXEC* HOOD 
S E L F , 5 SHELVES, HOOD 
DESK, SECTIONAL, 3 D U B U/ COUNTER 
HORK STATIONS, HIEH, PEACH 
HORK STATIONS, LOU, PEACH 
TABLE, LARGE, HOOD, WHITE TOP 
DESK, HALNUT, 3 OUR 
CHAIR, EXEC, MAROON, LEATHER 
CHAIR, EXEC, BLACK LEATHER 
DESK, 2DWR, LOT HOOD 
1169 AMERICA* EXPRESS 
1861 3 8 6 / 2 5 CONP,SEAGATE DR,128 A HRO D 
2311 BOOK SHELF ATTACHMENTS 
1613 CABINETS DEE13 OFFICE 
2 3 1 5 UDRLD TINE CLOCK 
1768 MISC. OFFICE F U N - D E E ' S OFFICE 
2126 HORK STATIONS V x 6 1 " 







































































































































IMAGES 1 ATTITUDE, INC. 
FIXED ASSETS-OFFICE EQUIPMENT 





























TYPEWRITER, BROTTO-CORRECTRONIC 34 
COPIER, LflNIER 526-AG 
POSTAGE METER, PITNEY BOWES, 6298 
TYPEWRITER, BROTHER AX-24 
TYPEWRITER, BLACK 
NICROCASSETTE SYS., CRAI6 W D . J5BS 
COPY MACHINE, AR 468 
COPY MACHINE, EP 6582 
COPIER, LANIER, NOD 6855 
COPIER, LANIER 6118 
FAX MACHINE, OMNIFAX B93 
TYPEWRITER, BROTHER, AX-24 
FOLDING MACHINE, MINOLTA F388 
SAFE DEPOSIT BOX, SAF, COMBO LOCK 
TYPEWRITER, BROTHER AX-26 
COPY MACHINE, LANIER 6242 
SCALE, MEASURES BRANS, GREEN 
FAX MACHINE, MINOLTA FAX 761 
TYPEWRITER, PANASONIC R448 
T . V . , QUASAR, 13* 
VACUUM, HOOVER UPRIGHT 
COOLER, COLD FRONT, BIONAIR BLK CF-5 
VCR, PANASONIC DI6ITAL QUARTZ 
VIDEO IMAGE ENHANCER, DETAILS I I I 
MICROCASSETTE TRANSCRIBER, PANASONIC 

































































































































































































1285 CHAIRS, WOODEN CASE 
1175DAMARK 
1785 TELEPHONE EQUIPMENT 
2321 TELEPHONE SYSTEM HOOKUP ANO MISC. SUPPLIES 































93,895.72 1,564.93 11,884.22 69,67192 
IHA6ES * ATTITUDE, INC. 
FIXED ASSE7S ANALYSIS 
TELEPHONE EQUIPMENT 
OATE EQUIPMENT VENDOR BASIS 
SL HONTH 1991 DEPR B.V. NO DP 
LIFE OEPR EXPENSE 12/31/91 199? MOTES 
89/05/30 OLD PHONE SYSTEM 3-0 COflNUNICATION 8,000.00 60 133.33 1,600 4,000 
90/07/27 DALLAS PHONE SYSTEM TSI 3,263.47 SO 54.42 653 2,286 54 
91/01/02 PBX EQUIPMENT 






60 3.02 36 145 3 
60 20.81 250 999 21 
92/02/01 OLD PHONE SYSTEM 
92/02/01 PBX EQUIPMENT 
92/02/18 PBX EQUIPMENT 
92/02/19 PBX EQUIPMENT 
92/02/28 PA SYSTEM 































TOTAL 69,027.73 938.87 2,533 7,430 1,017 
NOTES: (1) TRAOED IN OLD PHONE SYSTEM ON NEW PBX. 
BOOK VALUE -OLD SYSTEM $4,000. 
TRADE IN VALUE -OL0 SYSTEM $3,500. 
LOSS ON TRADE IN $500, INSIGNIFICANT-HOT BOOKED. 
3 3 
DHGES I ATTITUDES, INC 
FIXED ASSETS-COMPUTER EQUIPMENT 
8 8 / 3 1 / 9 2 





1 9 9 2 DEPR 
EXPENSE 
B . V . 
9 8 / 3 1 / 9 2 
ORDER CE TERMINAL, 'PERFECT' 
ADMIN CE COMPUTER, PC EPSON XT 
ART CE COMPUTER, PC 3 8 6 , MITSUBISHI, TONER, 8 0 C H D , 
COM? CE PRINTER, PANASONIC/HIDE CARRIAGE C32H0DEL t*X 
UOFF CE COMPUTER, PC XT, SAMSUNS 
flCCT CE COMPUTER, PC, SAMSUNG-XT 
ORDER CE PRINTER, LABELS, OKIDATA, MICROUNE 3 2 8 (9 PI 
COMA CE PRINTER, OKIDATA-NICROLINE 3 9 8 / 2 4 PIN 
ORDER CE PRINTER, CANDI, OKIDATA, NICROLINE 3 2 8 (9 PIN 
SHIP CE SHIP, PRINTER, LABEL, PANASONIC K I P - 1 1 8 8 
SHIP CE SHIP, PRINTER, REPORT, PANASONIC KXP-1188 
CON? CE PRINTER, PRINTRONIX, B I 6 
ART CE COMPUTER, PC 3 8 6 , MITSUBISHI, TONER, 1 RAM, 3 
COMP CE TAPE BACKUP, INTERNAL, 'MOUNTAIN* 1 5 9 / 2 5 8 KB 
COMP CE PRINTER, DIGITAL DESIGN-636 LAZES CX PRINTER 
UOFF CE PRINTER, EPSON L X - 3 8 8 
ADMIN CE COMPUTER, PC 2 8 6 , MITSUBISHI 
ACCT CE PRINTER, PANASONIC KX-P 18911 
UOFF CE PRINTER, PANASONIC KX P 1 8 9 1 
ORDER CE PRINTER, PANASONIC KX P 1 8 9 1 i 
ADMIN CE PRINTER, LASER, L A N I E R / 3 ' S 2 6 ' 
ART CE PRINTER, IMA6EURITER I I 
COMP CE SHITCHBOX, CURTIS DATASUITCH 
OPER CE PRINTER, PANASONIC KX-P11S8 
ART CE PRINTER, LASER, LANIER 2 8 8 6 
SHIP CE SHIP, SCALE, DETECTQ, PARCEL CONTROL SYS 
ACCT CE PRINTER, OKIDATA - MICROLINE 3 2 8 PIN 
COMP CE COMPUTER, SAMSUNG, CJ 4 6 8 5 , INTERN. SYSTEM, 1 
ORDER CE PRINTER, INVOICES, OKIDATA, MICROLINE 3 2 8 (9 
COMP CE COMPUTER, PC 4 6 6 , EVEREX, 16 RAM, 689HD, 2 4 P 0 
ADMIN CE COMPUTER, PC 2 B 6 , SAMSUNS 
WILL CE COMPUTER, PC, EPSON IE/COMMODORE 1483 
ADMIN CE PRINTER, OKIDATA 3 9 8 
ART CE MODEM, VIVA 2 4 8 8 
RES CE COMPUTER, PC 2 8 6 , SAMSUNS 
WILL CE TERMINAL, •PERFECT" 
ADMIN CE TERMINAL, "PERFECT" 
REB CE TERMINAL, "PERFECT" 
COMP CE TERMINAL, "PERFECT 
ACCT CE TAPE BACKUP SYSTEM, EXTERNAL, MOUNTAIN 
ART CE COMPUTER, MACINTOSH H e x , SAMSUNG MONITOR 
ART CE PRINTER, LASER MASTER 1 8 8 8 
ART CE COMPUTER, MACINTOSH S E 
COMP CE COMPUTER, PC 3 8 6 , "SAHTRONVGENERAL, 2KB RAN 
ACCT CE COMPUTER, PC 3 8 6 , CUMULUS 
COMP CE COMPUTER, PROTEK 3 8 6 S X , VOICE MAIL, 659KB KD 
ACCT CE COMPUTER, PC 3 8 6 , SYSTEM I I 


















1 19 W*f 
1 98-44 




































































































































































































































































































COMPUTER, INTEL 386SX, UNIX/BROCK, 
COMPUTER, PC 286, UNISONIC 
SEARGE PROTECTOR 
SOWER, XEROX 338/IMAGE 
COMPUTER, PROTEK 386SX, CANADIAN 
COMPUTER, INTEL 386SX, FAN BROCK 
TERMINAL, *UYSE* 
TERMINAL, *UYSE" 
MODEM, MULTI-MODEM V32 
88 MES REMOVABLE HD I CARTRIDGE 
32RAHt667H 
SCNNR, 13" COLOR MONITOR, 5 2 MES MACINTOSH HD 
3 8 6 / 3 3 COMPUTER, 128 MB HD, MOUSE, KEYBOARD 
386 COMPUTER, 8 8 MS HD, PRINTER 
RIACORP 
2 8 / 2 1 SOFTWARE 
UYSE COMPUTER TERMINALS 
EPSON LQ-578/24 PIN PRINTER 
CUMULUS COMPUTERS 386 /SX/48 
MAC IICI 
148 POHERBOOK LAPTOP MACINTOSH, 2488 BOD MODE 























































































































































146,982.38 2,448.37 18,762.79 94,328.53 
EXHIBIT C 
PURCHASE PRICE 
The purchase price shall consist of the assumption of the 
Seller's debt and the payment of cash for the amount the purchase 
price exceeds the debt. The final purchase price paid shall be 
adjusted based upon the total assets ultimately transferred by 
Seller and the debt actually assumed by Buyer. 
9 
EXHIBIT D 
ACCOUNTS AND NOTES RECEIVABLE 
10 
